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Abstract 
 
The standards setting process relies to an increasing degree on successfully integrating 
up-to-date research and development results (R&D). The successful interaction between 
research and standards can provide important social benefits. But, to do so, a number of 
challenges need to be faced. One key and persistent challenge is to provide the conditions 
in which the cross-purposes of formal standards-setting bodies and intellectual property 
rights can equitably be accommodated. This means balancing the collective gains to be 
reaped from the elaboration of a common standard against the individual gains to be 
allocated to relevant individual rights-holders. This discussion paper focuses on 
approaches to the reemerging tension between intellectual-property-rights and standards. 
It points to the importance that successful approaches can have to improve the interaction 
the between research and standardization activities. It then goes on to consider the 
(re)emergence of two approaches that are indicative of the changing relationship between 
intellectual property rights and standards-setting bodies.   
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““It is not enough to consider IP rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are 
actually used in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives in 
different industries.” Lemley 2002: 2.  
 
 
1. Introduction   
The relationship between intellectual property rights and formal standardization is as 
tense now as it has ever been. A series of current conflicts1 indicate that the tensions that 
first emerged between intellectual property rights and standardization during the 1980s 
and 90s are again under strain. The re-emergence of confrontation between these two 
cornerstones of the modern economy threatens the successful integration of new research 
into influential standards. This indicates that there is an increasing need to improve 
coordination in and between the research and the standards environments. Improvement 
entails enhancing positive socio-economic outcomes from the coordination of research 
and standardization activities while mitigating negative dimensions (e.g. club effects, 
regulatory capture). 
 
This paper discusses a set of approaches to coordinate the private interests broadly 
associated with research investments and the collective interests implied by formal 
standards-setting processes. It differentiates between traditional approaches to secure ex 
ante disclosure of intellectual property rights in formal standards-setting bodies (SSBs) 
from other, more actor-oriented approaches. Based on the earlier work of the respective 
authors on the IPR issues in SSBs, this paper moves on to discuss the significance of two 
alternative mechanisms to coordinate intellectual property rights in this environment: 
patent pools and new uses of Non-Assertion Covenants. We start by taking stock of the 
issues that arise between IPRs and SSBs in terms of the literature and in terms of 
evidence of the emerging tensions. We then review some evidence that alternative 
approaches to the straining relationship are needed, before looking at two notable 
examples:  adaptations of patent-pooling arrangements and the novel use of Non-
Assertion Covenants.  
 
2. Emergence of the conflict 
 
Formal committee-based standardization and IPRs are complimentary economic 
institutions whose international foundations reach back to the beginnings of modern 
economies2. Tension between them however is only relatively recent.  It grows out of the 
fact that the roles of IPR regimes and formal Standards Setting Bodies are inherently 
complementary in the changing frame of the innovation system. The complementary 
relationship has increasingly been strained during the past 2-3 decades as the use— and 
the conditions of use— of each have ‘co-evolved’ along with technological and 
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  Especially the cases involving Rambus and Qualcomm respectively (see below) 
2
  The treaties on which the International Telecommunications Union and on which the World Intellectual 
Property Organization are respectively based were entered into in the second half of the 19th century at the 
international level, while the history of patenting especially goes much further back in individual countries. 
It is a coincidence that the ITU and WIPO buildings (both UN organizations) face each other in Geneva.  
regulatory factors, especially competition law.3 The result has in the emergence of a 
fault-line along which divisive confrontations have periodically emerged in different 
guises.  It is important to the overall innovative system to keep the variety-creation and 
selection processes in balance (Carlsson, and Stankiewicz, 1992; David and Foray, 1995) 
yet the fault-line threatens this balance.  The increasing strain between Standards Setting 
Bodies and intellectual property rights can thus bee seen as an emerging area of dis-
coordination at a key juncture of the innovation system (Iversen, 1996; 2000; Blind and 
Iversen, 2004). 
 
Background issues  
To address this issue, and to begin to think of the conflict in terms of the impact on the 
interaction of research and standardization activities, we review the general trade-off that 
underlies the conflict.4 The fact that formal standardization operates in a state of trade-off 
with intellectual property rights has been focused on in the literature since at least the late 
1980s5. A pioneering work (Farrell, 1989) presented the question in terms of the costs 
and benefits of compatibility in network industries, indicating that stronger IPR may 
unduly strengthen the position of an individual ‘vested interest’ at the cost of delaying or 
undermining a socially beneficial outcome based on a common standard solution.6  In this 
analysis, the question involves equitably allocating the collective gains to be reaped from 
the elaboration of a common standard against the individual gains to be allocated to 
relevant individual rights-holders. But its wider implications can be amplified in 
situations involving competing technologies in the face of increasing returns and lock-in 
(Arthur, 1989). 
 
The expectation that the relationship between intellectual property and formal 
standardization is becoming increasingly tense is found throughout the 1990s. Weiss and 
Spring (1992) indicated that IPR issues could arise at different stages of the 
standardization process, and that ‘anticipatory’ standardization (Cargill, 1989) could 
itself produce new technologies with posed ownership question.  Based on the GSM 
experience, Miselbach and Nicholson (1994) spelled out some of the emerging issues in 
the telecoms environment, while Lea and Shurmer (1994) indicated how he changing 
regulatory environment strengthens the potential for conflict here. Looking at the 
complementary role between intellectual property and standardization, Iversen (1994; 
1995) anticipated that conflicts would increase in number and in scope,  with Iversen 
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 In the sense of Nelson (1994). See Iversen (1994; 1996; 2001) for the case that increased conflict of 
increased scope is to be expected as a function of the ‘co-evolution’ of institutional, regulatory, and 
technological factors.  
4
 This is in addition to the literature whose primary focus is on standardization. For surveys of different 
dimensions of this literature, see David (1987); Hawkins et al (1995); Schmidt & Werle (1998); Farrell & 
Klemperer (2004); Blind (2004).   
5
 For a survey of issues and the literature see Blind et al 2002; Lemley, 2002; Lin (2002) 
6
 “‘the more a standards body becomes an arena in which to fight over intellectual property spoils, the less 
likely it is to reach rapid agreement on choosing the ‘best’ technology, or on  any choice at all. The 
difficulty of reaching agreement may be measured by the size of the gains that must be allocated to one 
party or another compared to the common benefit of reaching agreement. Thus the more protection there 
is, the harder it will be for formal standardization to work.” (Farrell 1989: 43) 
(2000) making the case that the increasing strain can be seen as a function of a Nelsonian 
process of ‘co-evolution’ of institutional, regulatory, and technological factors (2000)7.  
 
The early focus, both in the literature and indeed on the approach to remedy it, has been 
on getting the individual right-holder to commit to the collective outcomes. Here, 
conclusions have been drawn about moderating the strength of IPRs (Farrell, 1989; 1995) 
and adjusting licensing conditions (Kleinemeyer, 1998). Since then, patents and standards 
have continued to proliferate and the technological and commercial environment has 
continued to change. The combination of factors has yielded scenarios in which 
allocations that might be equitable between the individual rights-holder and the collective 
interest can still lead to outcomes which are unsustainable. This scenario is one in which 
the cumulative costs that emerge from multi-right and multi-right holder scenarios. It has 
however been the law literature which has most consistently focused on the question 
(Good, 1991; 1992: Shurmer & Lea, 1995; Lemley, 2002; Lin, 2002)8 .  
 
The straining relationship was also mentioned in OECD’s report on ICT Standardization 
In The New Global Context Final Report (OECD/GD (96)86), and was highlighted in as 
a subsection in Kahin and Abbate (1995). In this edition, Farrell (1995) extends an earlier 
argument (gateway interfaces) to argue for weaker IPR protection in network 
technologies. Kleinemeyer (1998), who focus in general on standardisation between co-
operation and competition, confirms Farrell´s reasoning and suggests therefore a 
modified licensing system and reduced terms of protection. In the volume of Kahin and 
Abbate, Shurmer and Lea (1995) provide an early overview of the dilemma posed by IPR 
to the changing telecommunication environment.  
 
2.2. Emerging tension along the fault-line 
 
The earliest cases of conflict between IPR holders and formal standardization activities 
go back to the late 1970s, early 1980s9. A rash of very different disagreements emerged 
along the fault-line since, including cases involving ATM card10, 56k Modems, VL-Bus, 
UMTS,  digital VHF, Tetra, etc. The controversy surrounding the comprehensive GSM 
standards in the early 1990s brought the conflict onto an international level (Bekkers, 
2001; Iversen, 1996; 2000; Haug 2002; Dupuis 2002).  The pivotal Dell case in mid-90s11 
established in the US a presumption of search among IPR holding committee-members. 
Since then tensions have also moved outside the area of network technologies, which is 
the conflict’s heartland, to affect other technological areas (Blind et al., 2002). 
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 Thanks to Morris Teubal for this observation in 1996.  
8
 (e.g. Good (1991), Wilkinson (1991), Tuckett (1992), Buttrick (1993), Hanrahan (1995), Ask (1995) and 
Ellis (1995)). 
9
 The first relevant case appears to have involved a format for magnetically coding and storing information, 
Ansi’s standard for Group Coded Recording (GCR). Potter Instrument Co. v. Storage Technology Corp., 
207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763 (E.D. Va) cited in Mutter (2002). See also Updegrove. LAWS, CASES AND 
REGULATIONS. http://www.consortiuminfo.org/laws/#dell 
10
. Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), 
http://consortiuminfo.org/antitrust/stdi.php 
11
  In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). Docket No. C-3658 
 The recognition of the potential for conflict has not come all at once in different countries 
or in different technological areas or, not least, in different SSBs. The mode to address it 
has however tended to be the same: to enshrine ex ante non-disclosure rules into the 
bylaws of individual standards setting bodies. Starting with ANSI, which developed 
guidelines in 1992 for the implementation of its IPR policy (developed in the mid-1980s), 
and notably followed by ETSI, whose inception was accompanied in the early 1990s by 
an intense and revealing row over its IPR policy (cf. Commission; Iversen, 2001), the 
response to the dawning recognition of the potential for conflict has tended to centre on 
developing and improving the intellectual property policies of SSBs. This form of 
response has evolved to deal with the changing dimensions of this conflict, informed by 
regulatory guidelines (e.g. Com92/445 sets out principles following the GSM case in 
Europe) and by case law (especially the influential Dell case). In addition other related 
administrative issues can come into play (cf. voting irregularities in the Tetra case: 
Bekkers, 2001. Blind et al, 2002). 
 
Recent events have further contributed to a general environment of uncertainty by 
sending mixed signals, not least about the reach of IPR rules in the bylaws of individual 
standards setting bodies. These events also suggest that alternative approaches may be 
required to address conflict on this front. The first is the unprecedented Rambus case12. In 
it, the FTC overturned its own earlier ruling to find (August, 2006) that this ‘technology 
licensing company’ with no production facilities, had conspired, “…to distort a critical 
standard-setting process and engage in an anticompetitive ‘hold up’ of the computer 
memory industry.”13 An earlier FTC conclusion (in 2004) had, in contrast, laid the blame 
on JEDEC, the standards body, for inadequately addressing participant obligations about 
IPR disclosure in its bylaws. The change in position in the Rambus case at the FTC is 
only the latest in a line of contrary rulings about Rambus which stretch back to 2001. 
This case has raised uncertainty about how courts interpret the legal rights of individual 
rights holder as against the collective interest of standards-setting bodies.  It pits recent 
patent jurisprudence, which has tended to strengthen the rights of the patent-holder14, 
against the membership rules of an organization, where certain SSBs like the IETF, W3C 
and Jedec have followed a counter tendency inspired by the open source movement to 
discourage the inclusion of royalty bearing IPR in its standards.  Whereas the Dell 
Consent Consent decree in 1996 and previous rulings had established a precedence about 
the use of patents in relation to ongoing standards, the Rambus case has sent mixed 
signals, thus serving to raise uncertainty here.  
 
A second set of events involves the mobile-environment and the European SSB (ETSI) 
GPRS standard, which Qualcomm claims to infringe its patents. This case has a 
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 http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm 
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  The unanimous opinion states “Rambus’s conduct was calculated to mislead JEDEC members by 
fostering the belief that Rambus neither had, nor was seeking, relevant patents that would be enforced 
against JEDEC-compliant products. . . . Under the circumstances, JEDEC members acted reasonably 
when they relied on Rambus’s actions and omissions and adopted the SDRAM and DDR SDRAM 
standards.” http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm 
14
 See the Jaffe & Lerner (2004), and the vicissitudes of patent reform in the US.   
prehistory that goes back to the late 1990s when attempts to pool UMTS patents ran into 
problems with Qualcomm (see Bekkers et al, 2006). In the current set of cases, 
Qualcomm has agreed to license the eleven patents, claiming to abide by the terms of 
‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’ FRAND required by the ETSI.  (cf. Standards 
Blog, ConsortiumInfo.org) Nokia and other vendors have however rejected the licensing 
terms, leading to a spat of legal actions. Qualcomm has sued Nokia (as well as 
Broadcom) for patent infringement in the US and the UK, including a complaint with the 
U.S. International Trade Commission, while Nokia and five other entities have lodged a 
complaint against Qualcomm with the European Commission for excessive royalties15. 
At base, the conflict begs the question of what ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’ 
FRAND actually means. In August 2006, Nokia in effect asked a Delaware court to 
define FRAND, which is essentially the foundation for the ex ante disclosure rules of 
most standards-setting bodies and the regulatory framework that it builds on.  The events 
around this case therefore further draws into question the reliability of the established 
approach to deal with the conflict.  
 
3. Coordination mechanisms and their role in the R-S interface 
 
These are only two cases, in very competitive technology markets, in an environment of 
over a million supported standards16 and of an ever thicker undergrowth of IPR.  Two 
cases do not in themselves indicate that the coordination between IPRs and 
standardization activities is breaking down. They do draw into question whether the ex 
ante disclosure rules of SSBs provide a sufficiently reliable platform on which to stabilize 
the relationship between IPRs and SSBs.  It is therefore significant that both the 
regulatory framework and the market have been asking this same question.  Here we 
briefly review some the remarkable amount of debate that emerged when the US 
regulatory framework opened an inconclusive debate on this issue in 2002. In the next 
section we will move on to look at some of the alternative modes that have emerged to 
better coordinate intellectual property and standardization.  
 
Regulatory review of existing approaches  
In 2002 the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
dedicated a significant portion of its joint hearings on “Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” to the question of how to 
provide for a more favourable climate for the interaction between intellectual property 
and formal standardization activities. The hearings took place at an early stage of the 
Rambus case, and they focused particularly on the role of the IPR policies of SSBs. The 
arguments presented reveal some deep differences in opinions about the efficacy of this 
dominant focus to address the IPR-SSB relationship and about the role of the regulatory 
framework.  
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 complaint before the European Commission of telecom actors on the licensing terms of Qualcomm for 
patents deemed essential to WCDMA technology 
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  According to Consortiuminfo.org. See also Perinorm… 
Although ANSI’s approach and those that have followed it have exerted a harmonizing 
effect on the IPR policy of SSBs both in the US and elsewhere, Lemley (2002)17 
observed that there are wide discrepancies in how SSBs treat IPRs. ANSI itself observed 
that the different conditions that emerge at the fault-line between standards and IPR make 
a one-size fits all approach illusory. Some testimony indicated that the overall trajectory 
of the SSB IPR policy is moving in the right direction (cf. Updegrove) while others point 
to missed opportunities and inherent flaws (Cargill, 2002).  Balto & Prywes, 2002 called 
for FTC guidelines to correct inherent weaknesses in the general approach. Their ten 
recommendations were dismissed by others (Holleman, 2002) who argued that guidelines 
would be counterproductive. The exhaustive Lemley document does however find a set 
of ‘unresolved issues’ that confront how such intellectual property policies can be applied 
and enforced in an American environment. 
 
So far no unifying guideline has been issued. However, the DOJ and FTC did jointly 
open (in Spring 2006) for limited licensing discussions to take place in SSBs (one of the 
suggestions forwarded by Balto and Prywes). In sum these differences, and the fact that 
the hearings took place at all, support the impression that the current approach based on 
the different IPR policies of SSBs has not provided the stabilizing conditions to 
coordinate IPR in the environment of formal standardization.  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that this debate remains inconclusive. It is meanwhile 
significant that a set of alternative attempts have been emerging on the ground to resolve 
the tension. In addition to continued attempts to improve the IPR policies at standards-
setting bodies,  other mechanisms have emerged to address the need for coordinating 
multi-rights and multi-right-holder scenarios where a potential for ‘hold-up’ or simply for 
the cost of rights—cumulative or individual—to become prohibitive creates uncertainty. 
One mentioned in the literature (e.g. Graf & Zilberman, 2001) involves ‘patent clearing 
houses’ which have been forwarded in the field of the bio-agricultural research (cf. 
Meunier?). The patent clearing house’ approach involves a mechanism for academic 
researcher institutions to provide for free access to rights that might affect their research. 
This mechanism however does not seem to be sufficiently widespread in practice yet to 
affect the relationship between research and standardization. Other approaches include 
initiatives to adjust the quality and scope of patents, such as the IEEE proposal (in 
Spectrum journal) to develop a “limited patent” for software (2006).18  
 
Factors that contribute to the straining relationship 
Changes in the importance and the timing of standardization in the technological cycle 
have been especially important contributors to the straining relationship between 
intellectual property rights and Standards Setting Bodies. As the regulatory framework 
increasingly endorsed industrial self-regulation, standardization became much more 
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 ANSI pointed out the necessity of different approaches.  
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 IEEE proposal (in Spectrum journal) to develop a “limited patent” for software (2006). The idea, described 
by VNUnet as a ‘fast-track patent’ would be focus only on novelty requirements and it would have a life of 
four-years.  The novelty criterion focus would reduce the examination process, thus shortening the 
pendency period, while the shorter life period would improve turnover in the patent thicket.   
(http://www.vnutet.com/2149745)   
important to industrial development, especially in the US. (cf FTC, 1972)  This 
contributed to the strategic importance of standards. At the same time standardization 
started to move in front of the market, where it elaborated pre-commercial or 
“anticipatory standards” (Cargill, 1989). While this improved the timeliness of standards, 
especially in some key industries, the move increased the scope for conflict with IPRs in 
two directions. Weiss and Spring (1992) showed that conflict could emerge in three 
phases of the standardization process, and indicated that the development of standards 
could generate its own IPR, raising the question of how to divide it.  Moreover, the move 
towards ‘anticipatory standards’ moves the coordinating influence of standards-making in 
the direction of technological development which increases the likelihood of the standard 
to enter domains where IPRs are active and strategically important (Iversen, 1996).  
 
There are a wide set of determinants of the increasing risk. We can hear distinguish 
between three general sets of factors:  
 
1. Research related factors: Shorter and shorter live cycles; technology is 
increasingly cumulative (Ziedonis, 2002); the proliferation of patents and ubiquity 
in certain areas (patent-thicket area); the advent of broad-patents, see the 
complaint by W3C about the Eolas patent.  
2. Standards-related factors: the proliferation of standards bodies, changing status of 
traditional bodies in a tougher ‘market for standards’, a general rise in competitive 
stakes internationally(cf. 3G Mobile); Ongoing convergence. Not only between 
telecommunication and broadcast technologies, but also between IT, media and 
entertainment, CE markets and so on melt together.  
3. Actor-based factors: the emergence of technology-only firms where the sole focus 
on the development of new technology tends to upset traditional balancing acts 
between individual and collective interests.  Reasons for this include the fact that 
the firm of this type has weak incentives to cross-license but strong incentives to 
maximize profits.  
 
4. Coordination mechanisms and their role in the Research–Standardization 
interface 
In this light, this section will now go on to address some general dimensions of 
coordination mechanisms and their potential role in promoting interaction between 
research and standardization activities, while Section 5 will focus on two types: patent 
pools and new uses of Non-Assertion Covenants.  
 
Patent pools and related strategies such as the open-source inspired use of Non-Assertion 
Covenants are thus (re-)emerging to address coordination problems at the interface of 
research and standardization activities. The suggestion is that they are addressing an 
increasing need to improve coordination in and between the research and the standards 
environments. In this scenario, improvement entails enhancing positive aspects of 
coordinating research and standardization activities while mitigating negative dimensions 
(e.g. club effects, regulatory capture). This need is related to an assumed increase in 
collective activities both in the research and the standardization environments.  Firms and 
other actors are characterized by co-opetitive forms of interaction and by the pursuit of 
new coordination strategies.  Some of these changes affect the relationship between R&D 
as it takes place in and between firms and the successful fit with relevant standardization 
efforts, especially as they take place in formal bodies. (Kleinemeyer, 1998) 
Contemporary patterns of innovation are often thought of as involving the contribution of 
a wider constellations of participants who are engaged in more complicated forms of 
collaboration than ever before. A feature of the changing environment is the emergence 
of a set of mechanisms which facilitate the co-production, co-dissemination, and/or co-
use of new knowledge:  
 
• Mechanisms that coordinate research activities: R&D joint ventures, publicly 
funded research networks, cross-licensing arrangements,  etc 
• Mechanisms that coordinate standardization activities: alliances, publicly funded 
measures, consortia, the formal standardization infrastructure, (open source) etc.  
• Mechanisms that coordinate in the interaction between research and 
standardization frames.  
 
4.1. The interface between research and standardization.  
Current characteristics in the ‘market for technology’ (Geroski, 1995; Teece, 1981; Arora 
et al, 1999, 2000 etc) raise the importance of mechanisms to coordinate research and 
standardization activities but which also (re) introduce new concerns which affect the 
interrelationship between research and standardization activities. In fact, patents and 
standards in particular are key mechanisms in the emerging forms of interaction. 
Intellectual-property-rights, and particularly, “patents are designed to create a market for 
knowledge by assigning propriety property rights to innovators which enable them to 
overcome the problem of non-excludability while, at the same time, encouraging the 
maximum diffusion of knowledge by making it public.” (Geroski, 1995: 97) They 
provide the basis for licensing (cf. Arora et al, 1999). Kleinemeyer (1998), who focus in 
general on standardisation between co-operation and competition, confirms Farrell´s 
reasoning and suggests therefore a modified licensing system and reduced terms of 
protection. 
 
Standards too are taking on new roles to coordinate activity in this emerging 
environment. Langlois (2003) concludes that formal standardization activities is a 
market-supporting institution that has in part taken over the coordination problems which 
Chandlerian management is expected to solve.  “In many cases, the visible hand has 
indeed been socialized into technical standards that permit external mechanisms of 
coordination and reduce the need for rich information transfer.” (Langlois, 2003; 376)19  
 
In particular, the situation that has emerged, in which multiple patent rights involving 
multiple patent-holders overlap, means that finding a balance between the individual and 
the collective interests becomes more complicated. This multi-rights, cumulative costs 
scenario has been recognized to engender the potential for the ‘tragedy of the 
anticommons’ (Heller, 1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998)  in which rational individuals 
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 Quoted in Rejoinder (2004; 5). He stresses that this involves many cases and not necessary most and far 
from all.  
(acting separately) collectively waste a given resource by under-utilizing it. This may 
happen when too many individuals have rights of exclusion involving a scarce resource.20 
 
The risk of the tragedy of the anticommons (underuse) grows with the number of 
overlapping property rights. History teaches that formal standards are becoming prone to 
such situations. Any organisation that wants to implement a standard into a product, must 
ensure access to all essential patents (e.g. by obtaining licenses from all the holders of 
these patents). As a result, a standard that has many essential patents may suffer from 
underuse (lack of diffusion). It should be stressed that this type of underusage is different 
than the ‘normal’ type of underuse associated with the patent system (ie. the built-in 
trade-off in the balance between creation and usage).  Coordination mechanisms are 
called for when the cumulative claims of individual rights-holders to control the results of 
their R&D makes it impossible to realize the collective interest which would accrue both 
to the original IPR holders and to other contributing stakeholders from further building 
on the shoulders of the earlier R&D results. The result that original R&D results and the 
potential secondary results are undermined. The risk is found in the biomedical research 
(which has a lot of patented procedures), discussed by Heller & Eisenberg, as well as in 
the relationship between standardization and research. 
 
4.2. Modes of coordination: balance between individual and collective interests 
 
The following figure tries to put the need for mechanisms to coordinate R&D output in 
the standards frame into context of the increasing diversity of mechanisms to coordinate 
various stages in the relationship between research and standardization activities. It 
distinguishes between mechanisms to address separate needs: those that coordinate 
collaboration to develop new knowledge, those that coordinate collaborative efforts to 
harmonize during the implementation of new technology, and those that along side the 
other two attempt to coordinate access to existing proprietary knowledge. The 
mechanisms are arranged according to the trade-off between control and coordination. 
Those that imply greater levels of individual control over outcomes are arranged at the 
top, moving towards greater collective coordination as one moves down towards 
mandatory standards, as a form of regulation (cf. Holznagel & Werle, 2002; Werle & 
Iversen, 2005) and compulsory licensing provisions.    
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 The term "tragedy of the anti-commons" was introduced by Frank Michelman and popularized in the late 
1990s by Michael Heller. It has been applied to the standards case by a number of authors, see Lin (2002) 
for an overview.  
Figure 1: Differentiating modes of coordination 
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5. Case-study based discussion  
In this context the Interest project (EU 6th FP)  surveyed a set of mechanisms that are 
emerging to address the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
standardization. Based on interviews, we briefly follow the literature to look at the re-
emergence of patent pooling. We then look at the emergence of an emergent approach 
based on Non-Assertion Covenants.  Whereas the traditional IPR policy approach to 
promote IPR disclosure is more a demand-based perspective from the point of view of the 
IP users, these alternative and complementary approaches constitute a more supply-side 
mechanism (IP holder). These cases contribute to an understanding of how mechanisms 
are evolving to address the straining relationship between intellectual property rights and 
Standards Setting Bodies.  
 
5.1. Patent-pooling  
The patent pool is among the alternative or complementary approaches that has received 
most attention both in theory as well as in practice.  Although the patent pool has a long 
and chequered history stretching back more than 100 years, it has enjoyed something of a 
renaissance during the past decade or so. Patent pooling has been discussed from the 
point of view of addressing patent thickets (Shapiro, 2000; Merges, 1999; etc; Brenner, 
2004, etc). It has recently emerged in several cases to coordinate IP of multiple 
stakeholders more efficiently in relation to standardization activities (cf Tirole et al, ; Lin, 
2002; Updegrove, 200521; Bekkers et al, 2006), from the perspectives of individual 
countries (Junghon, 2004)  and in individual cases, like MPEG (Iversen et al, 2004).  
 
Patent pooling arrangements are rather heterogeneous, and their application extends 
considerably beyond cases involving a standard. However the emergence of pooling 
arrangements for different flavours of DVD, MPEG, RFID and other formal or 
semiformal standards have become front page news. Several types of patent pools can be 
distinguished.  
 
Pool model 1: Joint licensing schemes. These are initiated by a group of (usually larger) 
licensors of a particular technology (or standard). One of them may act as an agent for the 
joint licensing contract. For instance, Philips is the agent for both the DVD3 and the 
DAB joint licensing scheme. Most of these pools are eventually open to any holder of 
essential IPR to the standard in question, nevertheless, they started as a activity of a small 
group.  
 
Pool model 2: Patent pools with a licensing administrator. In this type of patent pools, 
there is an open call for essential patents for a certain standard by an independent body. 
Subsequently, the body has a patent evaluation carried out (usually by an independent, 
third party) to determine essentiality to the standard in question. A priori, the licensors 
that decide to join such a pool do not know who the other licensors will be that will 
become a member of the pool. A good example of such a pool is the MPEG-2 pool. The 
licensing administrator determines whether the patents are in fact essential, sets the 
royalty rate for the bundles (in dialogue with the licensors), and collects the royalties and 
redistributes them given a pre-agreed scheme.  
 
Pool model 3: Patent platforms. In this model, an organisational approach is adopted that 
deals flexible with multiple technologies (standards) and multiple product groups 
(employing one or more patents that are essential to a certain standard). It also aims to be 
more flexible towards the actual agreements between licensors and licensees. In the 
patent platform, there is one overall umbrella organisation, as well as multiple entities 
called ‘PlatformCo’, which each develop licensing programmes for specific standards. 
The aim is to have a standard offer (bundle) available (that the involved licensors cannot 
refuse). However, within the context of the patent platform, licensors and licensees may 
also agree upon other arrangements, possible involving cross licensing, the licensing of 
non-essential patents, and so on. To date, the 3Gplatform is the only example of such an 
approach. 22, 23 
 
The third-generation mobile telecommunications case is a special case, in the sense that 
the total number of essential patents for this single standard is apparently much higher 
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 In Goldstein & Kearsey (2004), the 3Gplatform founders explain the organisations model in detail.  
23
 Critical comments concerning patent platforms were expressed in EEtimes, (November 27, 1999), 3G 
intellectual property licensing strategy comes under fire, available at 
http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG19991127S0003. 
  
than for any other single compatibility standard, and that there are more different IPR 
holders than with other standards.24 This increases potential problems with a too high 
cumulative license fee. Also, patenting is (even) more strategic than in other areas: many 
patents seems to be technically very, very close, suggesting that their holder deliberately 
tries to get multiple patents on what could be considered as one single invention. 
 
Patent pools that bundle licensees for a specific technology, such as essential patents for a 
technical standard, can be called Technology-based patent pools. Typical features of the 
modern patent pool is that it makes all pooled patents available to each member of the 
pool, that it provides standard licensing terms to licensees who are not members of the 
pool, that it includes a simple, coherent menu of prices and other terms to licensees, that 
it allocates a portion of the licensing fees to each member according to a pre-set formula 
or procedure, and that it involves a consensus to license on FRAND considerations.  
 
In the current context, where RC and (F)RAND policies show their limitations, patent 
pools hold some promise to help: 
(a) bring transaction costs down25,  
(b) control the cumulative licensing costs, and  
(c) clear blocking patent positions and lessen access problems caused by 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Other goals of patent pools include the avoidance of costly infringement litigation26 and 
assure the interoperability and implementation of technical systems.27 An often-
overlooked aspect is the role of patent pools in that of a mechanism of information or 
knowledge exchange, e.g. unpatented technical information and information on the 
essentiality of IPRs.  
 
Because of these potential anti-competitive effects, competition authorities look with 
great attention to patent pools and comparable constructions. If these authorities do not 
find sufficient safeguards that prevent undesirable effects from happening, they will not 
allow such agreements. Participants will look for ways to include such safeguards. 
Mechanisms that can be included by the patent pool participants to reduce the risk for 
anti-competitive effects.  
 
5.2. Use of Non-Assertion Covenants  
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A newer approach involves the (multilateral) uses of ‘non-assertion covenants’ (NAC) 
that have recently emerged to reduce uncertainty about IPRs in the standards environment 
surround the document format standards.  In brief, ‘Non-assertion covenants’ are familiar 
bilateral agreements which accompany licensing agreements. However, when used as a 
unilateral agreements initiated by dominant players with large IPR holdings, they can 
significantly affect the licensing dynamics of a technology. In this case, they are used to 
signal to potential adopters of the standard (and to regulatory authorities who might be 
interested in the ‘openness’ of a given standard) of their intention not to assert such rights 
in as far as they overlap the area of an emerging standard.  
 
The covenant is based on the principle of reciprocity, meaning that it provides the strong 
incentive for other rights-holders to follow suit. The successful NAC can thus defuse the 
IPR question altogether, both for parties to the standards activities as well as for third-
parties. At the same time, the NAC can also serve to promote the adoption of the standard 
since it signals strong backing while it reduces uncertainty about what the terms of 
licensing are likely to be. 
 
The exemplary unilateral use of such an agreement stems from the open source 
environment where IBM recently issued a "Statement of Non-Assertion of Named 
Patents against OSS”28. The IBM statement, which was made in November 2005 in 
conjunction with the Open Invention Network (OIN) collaboration29, aims ostensibly to 
promote innovation in the open software space by not asserting a set of 500 US patents 
(and related patent family) for developers and/or users of Open Source Software. This 
statement, whose legal scope would need to be established in a definitive court case, 
includes a defensive clause addressing the assertion of third party IPR not only against 
IBM but for any “Open Source Software developer”: 
 
The IBM statement, developed for the open source environment, provides an immediate 
precedence for the unilateral use of ‘non-assertion covenants’ (NAC) in the area 
standardization. Non-Assertion Covenants have emerged against this background both in 
conjunction with the ODF and with the competing XML Reference Schema (see 
Updegrove’s coverage in ConsortiumInfo.org). The appearance of NACs has highlighted 
the question of how ‘open’ the competing standards are. Sun Microsystems issued its 
NAC to the OASIS consortium of which it is a member. The NAC spells out Sun’s 
intentions not to enforce any of its patent claims, provided other parties don’t enforce 
theirs for the standard, either for the current version of the ODF or any subsequent 
version in which it is involved in elaborating. Also, its defensive clause protects not just 
Sun, but any other developer, whether open source or not. The NAC represents a 
commitment by Sun to the standards consortium and to potential adopters of Sun’s 
intention. This commitment can be seen to be binding since it carries the weight of Sun’s 
member contract with the consortium.  Whatever its legal merits, the role of the NAC is 
significant in helping to lay the basis for the OpenDocument standard’s outward 
presentation as unequivocally ‘royalty-free’. This helps to dispel uncertainty about the 
licensing status of the standard, which after all involves major players with large patent 
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 which also involves Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and Sony 
portfolios, such as IBM, Sun, and Adobe. The signal that the NAC conveys both for this 
version and upcoming versions reduces the uncertainty of potential adopters on this 
important point. It also helps open source developers, who dislike the idea of having to 
obtain licenses (regardless of whether they are royalty free or not) for their activities. 
 
5.3. Discussion 
 
The relationship between intellectual property rights and standardization activities 
remains tense. The empirical work here acknowledges the need to find better ways to 
deal with those IPRs that may be deemed ‘essential’ to the functioning of a standard. As 
observed above, there are some general IPR related challenges and others related to the 
standards environment and to the emergence of new business-models among certain 
companies. The IPR related challenges include concerns about the quality of patents in 
general, about their applicability in software, about their potential to encumber interfaces, 
as well as about the way different actors use them. The emergence of this use of Non-
Assertion Covenants and the re-emergence of patent-pooling arrangements can be seen 
against this backdrop. And it can be seen in relation to other initiatives in this area as 
well, including the IPR policies of individual standards development organizations 
(SDOs) and to the open standards moment.  
 
The unilateral use of Non Accession Covenant illustrates the fact that new mechanisms 
are being tried in order to resolve the sorts of problems that can arise when a standard 
involves the IP of an unknown number of patent holders.  That approach attempts to 
return the relationship between standards and patents to a time when patents were 
employed defensively. This approach appeals to users in the public sector, and 
emphasizes the importance of support.  In this case, the advantages of a standard that is 
widely adopted outweigh the added prospect of royalty income. The NAC case attempts 
to circumvent this tangle of issues by using the IPR position of a dominant player to 
ensure the standard will remain Royalty-Free. But this is a special case and one where the 
markets structure, the legislative climate, and the type of technology all influence the 
equation. 
 
The NAC30 case is one in which the Standards body and the strategic use of the NAC are 
strongly aligned. Here the legal bond of the member company to the standards body 
provides some of the credibility of its commitment not to enforce its IPR.  At the same 
time, the existence of this NAC helps the standards body to bill the standard as ‘royalty 
free’. One of the concerns of SDOs involves the timely disclosure of essential IPR. Here 
the successful NAC actually moves a significant step beyond merely getting the holders 
of ‘essential’ IPRs to disclose in a timely fashion. Disclosure is a primary step to address 
the threat that IPR royalties pose to the development of a standard, and it has been 
addressed both in the courts since at least the early 1980s31 and since then by standards 
bodies. The NAC is the initiative of one IP holder who unilaterally acknowledges that it 
has rights which might be viewed as essential for the standard at hand; and it, as a matter 
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of public record, states its intention not to claim royalties for those rights provided 
reciprocity from other right-holders. Of course this action by a single actor does not mean 
that all rights will be disclosed by all other rights-holders or that they will follow suit in 
licensing terms. But it does force the hand of recalcitrant rights-holders and it ideally can 
set a standard for the way other all rights holders behave for purposes of the given 
standard. Failing that, playing the NAC card may be advantageous since it would tend to 
flush out any royalty-bearing rights at a relatively early stage. Moreover, Sun's NAC for 
ODF studiously avoids referring to “Essential Claims”, thus diffusing the potential for 
court battles as to what is and what is not essential.32 
 
Patent pooling mechanisms attempt to pool essential rights in order to provide an 
efficient mode to allocate individual gains against the collective gains of arriving at a 
viable standard.  The patent pool may help by: (a) lowering transaction costs, (b) by 
verifying and then coordinating cumulative licensing arrangements and (c) and by 
reducing access problems caused by opportunistic behavior.  Pooling mechanism can also 
increase transparency, lower uncertainty, lower search costs and speed up access. Here 
again the merit of the patent pool has to be confirmed for the specific case, based on 
competitive and the details of how it is arranged.  Indeed there may be economies of 
scale in the provision of third-party patent pools. There is an interesting development of 
independent licensing administrators that have developed patent pools processes, 
including open calls and external assessment of essentiality of the patents in the pools. 
Using a similar pool design for each time, they do not need to go through the business 
review process over and over again, saving time and costs. Although this process 
increases the risk of having several pools for a single standard (see above), they do seem 
to benefit both licensors and licensees and thus also society as a whole. In fact, some 
pools that were initially reported to be established by one of the licensees (the joint 
licensing programme model) were instead brought to one of these independent license 
administrators.33  This model may also be more efficient in dealing with potential 
litigation, which has been rising among patent pools in recent years.  
 
In general the case work suggests that patent pools can aid the diffusion of standards. In 
given situations they can be used to promote a standard or a technology, and that might 
lead to a substantially larger market, are more likely to succeed. The higher penetration 
(larger market) may offset the typically lower income per license of pools compared to 
bilateral licensing. When such a promotion of a technology is the key objective of the 
parties involved, this trade-off is acceptable and a patent pool makes sense. As such, they 
can indirectly  improve the interface between standards and research, as the more likely 
standards are going to be, the higher the incentive to bring research results into them. 
Also, with the outlook of a pool (and thus better accessibility of the IPR of others), it 
makes it easier for a firm to bring patent research results into a standard.  
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However, patent pools do not eliminate all problems. The two patent pool cases indicates 
that especially the most crucial problem, that of conflicts of interest,34 is not likely to be 
addressed successfully by pools. Also the problem of controlling the cumulative license 
fee is not likely to be solved by establishing pools. Although pools may have the effect of 
bring down these fees, this is only to the degree that the pools at the same time increase 
the total market size (by the promoting function of the pool). Pools that are established 
with the main goal of bring down the cumulative fee (e.g. using price caps) are likely to 
fail, as long as one may not expect the total market to grow substantially as a result of the 
creating of the pool. Finally, pools also do not seem suit to cope with the question of 
unwilling IPR holders, patent ambushing / submarine patenting strategies, patent trolls, 
etc. The situation is somewhat different in the Non Assertion Covenant case as presented. 
Here a major IPR holder in effect seems to take on the role of a ‘patent policeman’ to 
make sure that all parties, both those involved in the standards activities and 3rd parties, 
will not enforce their patents for the purposes of the standard.  
 
Innovative approaches are needed to deal with patents in standards.  But just as there is 
no one-size fits all for the IPR policies of Standards Setting Bodies (cf. Ansi, 2002; 
Lemley, 2002), nor does it appear likely that there a catch-all alternative approach. 
Notwithstanding the cases presented above indicate that standardization may indeed 
benefit from innovative approaches to overcome the tragedy of the anticommons, 
especially if coordinated with existing approaches35.  At all events, there is arguably a 
need to supplement the traditional ex ante disclosure rules of SSBs in light of the 
ambiguity inherent to the RAND model.  (cf. Balto & Prywes, 2002)  
 
The rise of the ‘technology-only’ firms (firms with a business model to exploit IPR rather 
than produce, such as Rambus or Eolas) is also a challenge to traditional attempts to 
balance between the individual and the collective interests in a standardization 
environment. Because these companies do not produce products, the appeal of cross-
licensing does not appeal to them. They develop new technology (ie. they are research 
based): their focus on maximizing license revenue is a business model that may generate 
traditional approaches  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A series of current conflicts indicate that the tensions that first emerged between 
intellectual property rights and formal standardization during the 1980s and 90s are again 
under strain. The re-emergence of confrontation between these two cornerstones of the 
modern economy threatens the successful integration of new research into influential 
standards. It has spurred new attempts to deal with patents and other IPRs in the frame of 
formal standardization at the institutional level (e.g. the IPR policies of SSBs), at the 
policy level (areas of competition, IPR, and standardisation policy, rules), and in other 
multilateral contexts (patent pooling and other licensing schemes).  
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 The question it raises is whether current approaches to disarm the conflict are sufficient 
or whether other approaches are necessary. This paper discusses a set of approaches to 
coordinate the private interests broadly associated with research investments and the 
collective interests implied by formal standards-setting processes. It differentiates 
between traditional approaches to secure ex ante disclosure of intellectual property rights 
in formal standards-setting bodies (SSBs) from other, more actor-oriented approaches. 
Based on the authors’ earlier work on the IPR policies of SSBs, this paper has discussed 
the significance of two alternative mechanisms to coordinate intellectual property rights 
in this environment: patent pools and Non-Assertion Covenants.  
References  
Arora A., Fosfori A. and Gambardella A. (2002), “Markets for technology in the knowledge economy”, International Social Science 
Journal, No 171, pp.115-128. 
Balto D and D Prywes (2002). Standard-Setting Disputes: The Need for Guidelines. 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/baltoprywes.htm 
Blind, K. Nikolaus Thumm, Rainer Bierhals,  Kamal Hossain, John Sillwood, Eric Iversen , Rik van Reekum, Bruno Rixius (2002). 
Study on the Interaction between Standardisation and Intellectual Property Rights. EC Contract No G6MA-CT-2000-02001 
Blind K and E Iversen(2004)The Interrelationship between IPR and Standardisation: Patterns and Policies. Presented at the EURAS 
Conference: Paris, 2004.  
Cargill, Carl F (1989). Information Technology Standardization: Theory, Process and Oranizations. Digital Press. 
Cargill, Carl F (2002). Intellectual Property Rights And Standards Setting  Organizations: An Overview Of Failed Evolution ( 
Submitted To The Department Of Justice And The Federal Trade Commission Carl Cargill Director Of Standards Sun Microsystems  
27 March 2002 ) 
Carlsson, B. and R. Stankiewicz (1991). On the nature, function and composition of technological systems. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics. 1, 93 – 118. 
Bekkers, Rudi (2000).The Development of European Mobile Telecommunications Standards: An assessment of the success of GSM, 
TETRA, ERMES, and UMPTS. PhD Dissertation. Technical University of Eindhoven: The Netherlands. 
Bekkers, Rudi, Geert Duysters and Bart Verspagen (2002) 'Intellectual property rights, strategic technology agreements and market 
structure - The case of GSM', Research Policy, vol. 31, pp. 1141-1161. 
Blind K (2004) The Economics of Standards: Theory, Evidence, Policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Blind, K.; Thumm, N.; Bierhals, R.; Hossein, K.; Iversen, E.; van Reekum, R.; Rixius, B. (2002)  Study on the Interaction between 
Standardisation and Intellectual Property Rights; Final Report to the DG Research of the European Com-mission (EC Contract No 
G6MA-CT-2000-02001), Karlsruhe. 
David, P.A. & D.Foray (1995), "Accessing and expanding the science and technology knowledge base", STI Review, nr.16. 
David, Paul A. (1987) Some New Standards for the Economics of Standardization in the Information Age.   In P. Dasgupta & P. 
Stoneman (Eds.) Economic policy and technological performance, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,  206-234. 
Dupuis, Phillipe (2002). The Franco-German, Tripartitie and Quadripartite Co-operation from 1984-1987.  in F. Hillebrand (ed). GSM 
and UMTS: the creation of global mobile communications.  John Wiley & Sons: UK.  
EU Commission (1992) Communication From The Commission - Intellectual Property Rights And Standardization /* 
Com/92/445final 
FARRELL, J., 1989. Standardization and intellectual property. Jurimetrics J.30 (Fall), 35-50. 
Farrell, J. ( 
Farrell & Klemperer (2004). Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects. Webversion. at 
wwww.paulklemperer.org.   
Geroski, Paul.  Markets for Technology: Knowledge, Innovation and Appropriability. In: . Stoneman (ed) Handbook  of the 
economics of innovation and technolocial change. Blackwell: Camabridge, USA. 1995 
Haug, Thomas (2002). The Market Fragmentation in Europe and the CEPT Initiatives in 1982. in GSM and UMTS: the creation of 
global mobile communications. Hillebrand, F (ed) 
Goldstein, L.M & Kearsey, B.N. [2004]. Technology Patent Licensing: An International Reference on 21st Century Patent Licensing, 
Patent Pools and Patent Platforms. S.l.: Aspatore.  
Good, Diana.[1992] How Far should IP Rights have to Give Way to Standardization: The Policy Positions of ETSI and the EC. 
EIPR:9:295-297. 
Good, D. (1991) 1992 and Product Standards: A Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights? EIPR:11:398-403. 
Graff, G and D Zilberman. 2001. Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotechnology. IP Strategy 
TodayNo. 3-2001, pp 1-13. 
Hawkins, R., R. Mansfield & J. Skea (Eds.). (1995) Standards, innovation and competitiveness. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Heller, M.A. and Eisenberg, R.S. (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science, Vol. 
280, May 1998. 
Holleman,  (2002) Response: Government Guidelines Should Not Be Issued In Connection With Standards-Setting.Presented at the 
Joint Hearings of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission regarding “Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” Washington, D.C. 
Holznagel B and R Werle (2004) Sectors and Strategies of Global Communications Regulation, in Iversen(ed). special issue of 
Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 17:2. 19-37.  
Iversen, E. (2000): Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: Conflicts Between Innovation and Diffusion in New 
Telecommunication Systems, in: Information Technology Standardization: A Global Perspective, edited by Kai Jacobs, Idea Group 
Publishing: Hershey, London, pp. 80-101 
Iversen, E.J. (1996). Standardization and intellectual property rights: Conflicts between innovation and diffusion in new 
telecommunications systems. Paper presented at the ETIC (Economics of Technology and Industrial Change) workshop, May 1996 in 
Maastricht, Netherlands. 
Iversen, Eric. (1994) Legal Aspects of Technical Change: the conflict between Standardization Development Organizations and IPRs 
in the adoption of the GSM standards.  Thesis submitted for the degree of MA, Universitetet i Oslo / Facultés Universitaires Namur de 
la Paix. 1994. (Masters thesis)  
Junghoon, KIM (2004), Technical Standard-Setting, Patent Pooling, and Competition Policy, Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP), 
Tokyo, Japan. 
Kahin, B and J Abbate, eds., Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995. 
Kleinemeyer, J (1998). Standarisierung zwischen Kooperation undWettbewerb, Frankfurt/Main et al.: Lang.  
Kulbaski, J.J. (2002). Comments On Patent Pools and Standards For Federal Trade Commission Hearings Regarding Competition & 
Intellectual Property. (A submission to the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission 
Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy). 
Langlois R and Robertson P, "Networks and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo 
Component Industries", Research Policy 21(4): 297-313 (1992), reprinted in Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy, and Richard 
Langlois, eds., Managing the Modular Age: Architectures, Networks and Organizations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, pp. 78-
100.  
Langlois, Richard N. “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism,” Industrial and Corporate Change 12 
(April 2003): 351-85, 
376. 
Langlois, 2004. Rejoinder. Enterprise and Society Symposium on 'Chandler in a larger 
frame.'http://web.uconn.edu/ciom/Rejoinder.pdf.  
Lea, G. & M. Shurmer, 'Clash of the titans? Intellectual property rights and telecoms standards', in Media Law & Practice, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 1994, p. 89-93. 
Lemley, Mark A., "Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations" (April 2002). California Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 
1889, 2002 
Lin, Daniel (2002). Research versus development: Patent pooling, innovation and standardisation in the software industry. 1 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prpo. L. 274. 
Merges, R.P. (1999). Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case for Patent Pools.  
Miselbach, R. and Nicholson, R. (1994): Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization. Sec. Update, Sophia Antipolis, FR.  
Mutter 2002.Industry Standard Committee Membership and its Potential Effect on Patent Enforcement. BSKB News.  Vol. 15, no. 2 
(Fall 2002) 
Nelson, Richard R. (1994) The co-evolution of technology, industrial structure, and supporting structure. Industrial and Corporate 
Change. 3(1) 47-63. 
Schmidt, Susanne K. & Raymund Werle (1998). Coordinating technology: Studies in the International Standardization of 
Telecommunications. MIT: Cambridge, Mass. 
Shurmer M and Lea, G (1995). Telecommunications standardization and intellectual property rights: a fundamental dilemma? 
Shapiro, C (2001), Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy an d the 
Economy (Adam Jaffe, 
Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds., National Bureau of Economics, 2001);  
Updegrove, A. LAWS, CASES AND REGULATIONS. http://www.consortiuminfo.org/laws/#dell 
Updegrove, A. OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT DYNAMICS OF CONSORTIUM STANDARD SETTING. Presented at the 
Joint Hearings of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission regarding “Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” Washington, D.C. 
Weiss M and MB Spring. Selected intellectual property issues in the standards development process. In  1992 Telecommunication 
Policy Research Conference, Solomons MD, September 1992. 
Ziedonis,A (2002).  ‘When the Giants’ Shoulders are Crowded. 
 
Other literature 
EC (2004), Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of technology transfer agreements. 
EC (2004b) Commission Notice, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, 
(2004/C 101/02) 
European Commission (1991), Eleventh Report on Competition Policy. 
European Community (2004), COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements. 
European Community (2004a), COMMISSION NOTICE Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology 
transfer agreements (2004/C 101/02). 
European Union (2002). Antitrust clearance for licensing of patents for third generation mobile services. Letter to 3Gpatents, dated 12 
November 2002. 
Fair Trade Commission (1999). Guidelines for patent and know-how licensing agreements under the antimonopoly act. Japan.  
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2003). To promote innovation: the proper balance of competition and patent law and policy.  
In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). Docket No. C-3658 
Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988),  
Balto, D "Standard Setting in the 21st Century Network Economy," 18 Computer & Internet Lawyer 1 (June 2001) 
Bekkers, R. & Liotard, I. (1999). ‘The tense relation between mobile telecommunications standards and IPR.’ In: European 
intellectual property review, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 110-126. 
Bekkers, R. (2001). The development of European mobile telecommunications standards: An assessment of the success of GSM, 
TETRA, ERMES and UMTS (doctoral dissertation). Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.  
Bekkers, R.N.A. (2001a). Mobile Telecommunications Standards: GSM, UMTS, TETRA and ERMES. Boston, MA: Artech House. 
Hawkins, R 1999: The rise of consortia in the information and communication technology industries: emerging implications for 
policy, Telecommunication Policy, 23(2): 159-173.  
Iversen, Eric (2001) Patenting and voluntary standards: the tension between the domain of proprietary assets and that of "public 
goods" in the innovation of new network technologies. Science Studies, 14. 2: 2001. 
Iversen, Eric (2001). Raising Standards: Innovation and the emerging global standardization environment for ICTs. In Sherrie Bolin 
(2001). The Standards Edge. Bolin Communicaitons: Ann Arbor, MI. 
Iversen, EJ, Øversjøen, E, and Thue Lie, H. (2004) Standardization, Innovation, and IPRs. Telektronikk 100.2: 65-79. 
Iversen EJ & Tee R  (2006), 'Standards dynamics and industrial organization in the mobile telecom sector', in E. Bolin & C Palmberg 
(eds) special issue of INFO on ‘Next  generation mobile telecommunications networks - Challenges to the Nordic ICT industries’, Vol 
8 No 4. 
Kretchmer, K (1997,2005) Communications Standards and Patent Rights: Conflict or Coordination? 
Http://Www.Csrstds.Com/Star.Html   
Prywes D. Patent Ambushes and Licensing in Computer Standard-Setting Groups," Antitrust Report (March 2001) 
Werle R and Eric J. Iversen (2006) Promoting Legitimacy in Technical Standardization. In Science, Technology & Innovation 
Studies, Vol. 2 (2006), No 1, p. 19-39. See: http://www.sti-studies.de/articles/2006-01/werle.htm
Annex 1Comparison of individual patent pools and other coordination mechanisms 
 
 
Case DVD/MPEG technology Second- and third 
generation mobile 
telecommunications 
(2G/3G) 
Open document 
standards 
IPR coordination 
initiative 
3C DVD patent pool and 
DVD-6C patent pool36 
MPEG 2 patent pool 
(MPEG-LA) 
UMTS pool (3Gpatents) Competing Non Assertion 
Covenants 
Coordination 
mechanism (subtype) 
Patent pool (joint licensing 
program) 
Patent pool (Patent pool 
with a licensing 
administrator) 
Patent pool (patent 
platform). Particularity: 
original ideas was that all 
licensees and licensors 
would still get into 
bilateral license 
agreements 
Non assertion covenants 
with a ‘patent policeman’ 
Administrator One of the licensors Independent licensing 
agency 
Independent licensing 
agency 
Dominant IPR holder 
Main drivers for 
setting up mechanism 
Promotion of the standard 
and the technology 
Combination of promotion 
and reducing transaction 
cost 
Price control, ensuring 
access 
Ensure royalty free 
licensing. Signal to 
adopters 
Response to regulatory 
concerns 
Interests of actors Single worldwide standard 
agreed (at least for DVD) 
Mixed, though still 
possible to align 
Difficult to align, 
worldwide/regional issues 
Promote the adoption of 
the standard 
Competition Within standard Between standards Between standards, 
between technologies 
Between standards and 
approaches 
Business models 
issues 
Mainly production-driven 
business models (though 
this might change) 
Mixed. Also issue of 
licensing base calculation 
IPR-driven business 
models as well as 
production-driven business 
models 
Market with a dominant 
player; regulator issues 
involved 
Standardisation mode Forum/consortia type 
standardisation, with no 
pre-agreed IPR procedures 
in place 
(Semi-)formal Formal bodies, IPR 
procedures in place 
Consortia 
Pool initiator A grouping of the large 
licensors themselves 
Independent licensing 
agency 
Independent body (though 
initiative is from 
standardisation scope) 
A set of computer and 
computer program 
companies 
Setting up procedure Closed start, later allowing 
other licensors to join 
Open call Open call Unilateral 
Outcome Two pools for the same 
standard 
For some standards: two 
competing licensing 
agencies, together offering 
a rather comprehensive 
coverage 
Single pool proposal, but 
limited coverage (no more 
than approx. 5% of all 
essential patents) 
Two standards with two 
NACs vying for 
recognition by regulators 
and the market. Currently 
in play 
Relation to 
standardisation 
Weak Weak. Acting only after 
the standard is all set 
Strong. It was from the 
standardisation sphere that 
the idea for a pool started 
Strong. The standard forms 
the basis for the NAC 
Number of patents Low (few dozens) Low to medium (few to 
several dozens) 
Very high (>1000) High 
 
                                                 
36
 For this comparison, we only take the pool into account as far as it relates to DVD-essential patents. The 
patents on other standards, such as the ‘dash’ and ‘ plus’ standards for recordable CD’s are not taken into 
account 
Pro-competitive effects (depending on the exact conducts concerning of the pool) mostly 
involve promoting technology transfer. See Beeney (2002); Bekkers et al, 2006. An 
itemization of the effects  include the following:  
 
(P1)  Facilitating equal access to licenses for all potential licensees; 
(P2)  Speeding up access to technology; 
(P3)  Integration of complementary technologies; 
(P4)  Reduction of transaction costs for both licensees and licensors; 
(P5)  Possible clearing blocking positions; 
(P6)  Avoidance of costly infringement litigation; 
(P7)  A potential reduction of the cumulative license fee;  
(P8)  Protection against certain strategies of patent holders (such as bundling essential IPRs with non-
essential ones); 
(P9)  Guaranteed non-discriminatory and equal access to all potential licensees. (At least, if agreed in the 
portfolio license conditions. See also the MFN clause below);  
(P10)  A valuable source of information to would-be licensees (For example, the portfolio list must give a 
decisive answer to which patents of the participants are essential to a standard and which are not.)  
The main possible anti-competitive effects include the following:  
(A1)  Restrict competition between the licensors that participate in the pool, and serve as a price-fixing 
mechanism. This could especially be the case if substitute patents are in the pool, ultimately 
resulting in rising the price for products and services that utilise the pooled patents;  
(A2)  Have anti-competitive effects for licensees, as it could force them to purchase patents that they 
normally would not have selected (for instance, if a pool were to include two cost-effective but not 
essential methods to manufacture a display for a mobile phone, a manufacturers would prefer to 
license only one of them, but the pool would force this firm to license both);  
(A3)  Have anti-competitive effects for non-participating firms that hold patents that are substitutes to 
patents included in the pool. Since the licensee of the pool already has to pay for all patents in the 
pool, it might not select this competing patent, even if the latter is considered to be superior; 
(A4)  Limit competition in downstream products incorporating the pooled patents, or in other markets that 
are somehow related to those (for instance, a patent pool for the DVD standard could potentially 
limit competition in the market for DVD players, in the market for DVD disks, or in the market for 
content that will be produced for that medium); 
(A5)  Have anti-competitive effects towards other standards or technologies, as it might reduce the 
availability of patents that are technically or economically essential for those other standards; 
(A6)  Remove incentives for further innovative behaviour. If a pool is already there, there is little to gain 
from developing an alternative (substitute) to one of the technologies in the pool, as licensees 
already pay for the one that is part of the pool (see A3, above). 
 
 
